Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think that Senator Casey expresses, probably, the feeling each

one of us have as we visit with our constituents, who are seized

with this issue in the same way that we are, and want to know

what they can do, as groups, as church groups or civil groups in

our society. And you’ve been a very good interpreter, for many

months, given your own trips. So, I appreciate, especially, your testimony,

because it’s founded, really, upon being there.

Let me just ask you to trace potential solutions. If, finally, things

began to move, physically what would happen to those who are

now being persecuted or who are in the camps and in danger of

being persecuted by the Janjaweed, or whoever else might attack

them? Would you also try to describe the scene as to so-called

rebels who are in the territory who have a more civil governmental

function namely, upsetting the government itself—perhaps leaving

aside the agriculture people who have lost their animals, lost their

lands. Can you give some scenario or sort of business plan of how

life might become, potentially, normal for each of these groups?

Who would need to do what?

How will the oil revenue figure into this? Is this

a part of the agreement, in broad terms, that comes with peace,

that the government makes a commitment of this sort? What sort

of commitment would we need to make?

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just say that I’ve really come to this question period without

wanting to argue with any of the witnesses, and I think this

has been a very important educational experience, for each Senator

and for those who are with us in the audience today, to consider

a number of options, some of which have been argued, but, I think,

none so persuasively.

I appreciate, in a personal way, the reunion with Susan Rice. I

think her service was remarkable in a previous administration, and

we once, Mr. Chairman, served on a selection committee for Rhodes

Scholars, and I learned of her brilliance and analytical ability at

that time.

But let me just say that, as I listened to courses we might take—

for example, you mentioned, Dr. Morrison, that we’ve embarked on

nation-building. And—maybe—but this worries me. Not that we

should not do this. I’m one who has argued, for some time, along

with the chairman, that nation-building is probably very important.

We’ve even argued with the State Department to try to

employ persons, in some numbers, who might be helpful in this

respect, given the number of failed states, broken nations around

the world. But we’re not really at that point, as a government. Our

capabilities are still very limited.

So, for instance, when the chairman conducted hearings prior to

the invasion of Iraq, and we tried to think through what it would

mean if Saddam fell, if the Government of Iraq was no longer functional,

the amount of testimony we had was pretty sparse on the

part of the administration and with regard to the rest of the intellectual

community, not measured—better informed. This is very

tough stuff, but important.

And the reason I pursued the questions I did with Andrew

Natsios, is that, at the end of the day, we’re trying to think, obviously,

not only how to save people from being killed, but how

they’re going to live successfully, how 21⁄2 million people are going

to regain stature, their livestock, their lands. And we have, at least

with Sudan, if we were to look at it from the nation-building standpoint,

a revenue stream of oil, which is sometimes not available

even after humanitarian crises are solved.

Now, in this particular case, it seems to me there is a further

thought, and that is, with 13,000 humanitarian workers, which

you’ve mentioned are on the ground, their safety is of substantial

importance for us. I’ve listened carefully to Dr. Rice and her comments—

but to get into a military action at this point, enticing as

this might be, would perhaps stimulate countermeasures—

counteractivity against those humanitarian workers. So, the question

is: How do we protect the process of feeding 21⁄2 million people

while military action occurs? Now, you could argue that the military

action is very limited, that the bombing of airfields or strikes

against aircraft, the knocking out of various equipment, really just

shows more that we’re serious, I suspect, rather than to overthrow

the Government of Sudan. But I’m not certain what the consequences

are of that. It may be important to do, ultimately. This

is one option I would want to walk around a good bit before we

have commitment of military force on the part of the United States,

and especially unilaterally.

Now, mention has been made that our forces are stretched, at

this point. Well, this could lead to another debate about Iraq,

whether we should have devoted as much there, with all the crises

that go on in the world. An important point. But the fact is, even

as we speak today, the problems of recruitment for our Armed

Forces, the issue of re-upping Reserves who would not expected to

be called back, is crucial. Now, maybe you believe we can segregate

the Air Force from all of this. I’m not certain it ever works that

neatly.

So, these ruminations that I have, listening to all of this, lead

me to—still to believe that probably the diplomatic track is the important

one; that if the sanctions are especially brilliant, they may

be helpful. It turns out, I think, in the North Korean situation, that

sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury with regard to the Macao

Bank were peculiarly effective in ways that a whole raft of sanctions

against North Koreans for years were not particularly

effective.

Now, there’s not equivalence between those two states, nor specifically

what we’re looking for. But I would want to think through,

with all of you, as the expert panel, what combination is likely to

be effective, and how do we avoid, as you’ve suggested, alienating

the Chinese—who have been very effective with us in the North

Korean negotiations; also, potentially, with the Europeans, an

effective combination of states and activities, if we are able to bring

about such a coalition, with regard to Darfur and Sudan.

So, let me just simply ask this question. What kind of preparation

do you believe our Government must have before we can be

effective, in terms of a Sudan? Leave aside whether we build it or

not. What can, in fact, offer the possibilities of economic security

for its population, north and south, and interact with the rest of

the world? If we become involved in that question, it seems to me,

we may have a business plan that works so that, finally, we come

to the end of the day with some long- and short-term humanitarian

benefit for everybody. Now, does anybody want to comment about

any of this?

Yes, sir.